The Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921
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06 December 2021Many Irish Americans I meet here take a keen interest in Irish history and especially in the turbulent events of a century ago. Inevitably, however, the rush of developments at that time can be difficult to grasp. I have written this blog to explain to my American audiences the immediate background to the emergence of the Irish Free State in 1922, and in particular the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921 that paved the way for Irish independence.
The events of December 1921 and of 1922 (the advent of independence and the outbreak of civil war) were part of the legacy of the Easter Rising of 1916. The Rising put in motion a struggle for independence that resulted in the establishment of the First Dáil (Parliament), which in January 1919 issued a Declaration of Independence, and Ireland’s War of Independence, 1919-21.
After two and a half years of turmoil, a truce was announced on July 11th 1921, which brought that conflict to an end and triggered negotiations designed to find a settlement acceptable to the British Government and the leadership of Sinn Féin, which steered Ireland’s freedom struggle. There were preliminary talks between Eamon de Valera and Lloyd George in the summer of 1921, but the negotiations began in earnest on October 11th with the aim of ‘ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations’. Once negotiations got underway, some form of compromise between the two sides was inevitable. At stake was the precise nature of that compromise.
De Valera decided not to lead the negotiations, but to remain in Dublin, a move that has generated a lot of debate over the years. His argument was that, as President of the Republic, he ought to remain in reserve. What was perhaps more perplexing than de Valera’s absence from the negotiations was the failure of communication between the delegates and their home base, which points to inherent personal tensions within what had appeared to be a united national movement. De Valera had been away in America throughout most of the war of independence and that may have diluted his authority vis-a-vis the other leading lights in Sinn Féin.
The Irish delegation consisted of Arthur Griffith, founder of the original Sinn Féin party in 1905, but who had ceded its leadership to de Valera in the aftermath of 1916; Michael Collins, the most prominent figure from Ireland’s war of independence; Dublin lawyer, Eamon Duggan; Wicklow landowner, Robert Barton; and George Gavan Duffy, who had risen to prominence defending Roger Casement during his trial for treason in London in 1916. Erskine Childers and John Chartres, both English-born converts to the cause of Irish independence, acted as secretaries to the Irish delegation.
The Irish side were up against a strong British Government team, which included two of the country’s leading 20th century politicians, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, as well as Austen Chamberlain, a future British Foreign Secretary, and Lord Birkenhead, who was known for his firm opposition to Irish nationalism.
The negotiations continued intensively until agreement was reached on December 6th. Discussions revolved around three key issues: the constitutional status of Ireland; the oath of allegiance; and the position of Northern Ireland. It was hard going and agreement did not come easy on account of the tension between the deep British attachment to the symbols of Empire and the dogged Irish demand for a Republic.
Ultimately, the Irish delegates concluded that they had secured as much as was feasible at that time and, under an ultimatum from Lloyd George, signed the Treaty on December 6th. The Treaty sowed deep divisions within the Sinn Féin movement that ultimately, and tragically, led . led to civil war after the Treaty was narrowly approved by the Dáil in January 1922. But what was agreed between the Irish and British negotiators?
Ireland achieved the status of a dominion within the British Empire like Canada, Australia and New Zealand at that time. Controversially, this entailed officeholders pledging to be faithful to the British monarch, which proved to be especially unpalatable to those in Ireland who had, in their minds, irrevocably committed their allegiance to an Irish republic. Provision was also made for Britain to retain the use for naval purposes of certain Irish ports. That arrangement remained in place until 1938 when an Agreement was reached to end it, which enabled Ireland to declare itself militarily neutral in World War Two.
The Treaty allowed the six counties that comprised Northern Ireland, whose own parliament had been formally opened in June 1921 under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, to opt out of the Irish Free State, which it quickly did.
A key component of the Treaty concerned the setting up of a three-member Commission to fix the boundary between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland. The Irish delegation pinned its hopes on what it saw as the likelihood that this Boundary Commission would allocate much of the counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh, which had significant nationalist populations, to the Irish Free State, thus ultimately undermining the viability of Northern Ireland. This part of the Treaty specified that the Commission was to ‘determine in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions’ the boundaries of the new State. That wording proved disadvantageous to the Irish cause and, when the Boundary Commission reported in 1925, the end result was the status quo of a six-county Northern Ireland.
What is there to say about the Anglo-Irish Treaty?
First, it was a considerable achievement for Ireland to wrest its independence from a reluctant British Government. Dominion status akin to Canada and Australia (both faraway territories whereas Ireland was on Britain’s doorstep) was a big advance on what had been on offer to Ireland in the Home Rule Act of 1914
Second, it makes little sense to try to apportion praise and blame to the protagonists on the Irish side. All were caught in the white heat of conflict and negotiation and were, in my firm view, seeking to do their best for the Irish cause as they interpreted it.
Third, in 1921 Sinn Féin was a broad-based movement, encompassing those who had held a range of political views prior to 1916 – Home Rulers, members of the original Sinn Féin which favoured a dual monarchy and heirs to the Fenian tradition committed to outright independence. This makes it hardly surprising that divisions developed as the struggle for freedom approached the finishing line,
Fourth, partition was not a consequence of the Treaty. It had already been brought about by the Government of Ireland Act. The Irish negotiators may have placed undue faith in the Boundary Commission and it is possible that the British negotiators never had any intention of seeing the border being altered to reflect the preferences of local communities.
Fifth, the desire for a republic was sincere and understandable in the light of Ireland’s baleful historical experience of foreign rule. The question is whether there was any set of circumstances in which that could have been obtained in 1921. Collins certainly thought that a renewal of conflict would have been unsustainable on the Irish side, but others thought differently.
Sixth, although the arrangements embedded in the Treaty were not ideal, they did allow for the emergence of an independent Irish State, albeit not of the character or the dimension that had been anticipated or desired. It is a State that I have been privileged to serve as a diplomat for more than 40 years and I intend to celebrate its accomplishments in the coming year, without of course ignoring its failings, which, as it happens, had little to do with the Treaty signed in London on December 6th 1921.
Daniel Mulhall is Ireland's Ambassador to the United States.